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Abstract 
The two-sector endogenous growth model of Rebelo (1991) and Felbermayr (2007) is 
embedded within an asymmetric two-country international trade and bargaining 
framework. Starting with a free trade equilibrium, the analysis reveals that: (i) foreign aid 
can increase the total world production of consumption goods due to specialization, raise 
therefore welfare in both countries and place both countries on a Balanced Growth Path 
(BGP); (ii) a trade agreement that is based on bargaining and endogenizes the linkage 
between foreign aid and adoption of trade policies generates higher welfare for both 
countries compared to autarky; (iii) with bargaining, the richer country's welfare 
increases while the poor country's welfare decreases compared to their welfare levels in 
case of free trade, despite the foreign aid transfer from the rich to the poor country.  
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1. Introduction 
In this article we analyze a theoretical model in which two countries bargain over a trade 
agreement. The agreement specifies the size of the foreign aid to be given by a rich 
country to a poorer one, and the terms of the trade that take place between the two 
countries after the aid is given. The aid in our analysis is given not because of any 
assumed generosity on the part of the rich country, but because it improves the capital 
allocation across the world and raises total world production. This world production 
surplus enables the rich country, through international trade, to raise its equilibrium 
consumption and welfare beyond their no-aid levels. To ensure it, and to push 
consumption and welfare as high as possible, the rich country uses a trade agreement to 
condition the aid on favorable terms of trade.  
 An important assumption in our model is that international loan markets are 
imperfect.1  It is due to this assumption that aid can improve the capital allocation across 
the world and raise total world production. We also show how due to this increased world 
production it is possible that the rich country may benefit from giving the aid even if it is 
merely a gift in the sense that after the aid is given the trade between the two countries is 
perfectly free, rather than subject to the stipulations of an agreement. 
 It is possible though, depending on initial conditions and parameter values, that an 
aid given as a gift is not beneficial to the rich country. In that case the aid will be granted 
only if the subsequent international trade is not free but based on a trade agreement the 
terms of which favor the rich country.  
                                                 
1
 This assumption reflects both theoretical and empirical findings. Bulow and Rogoff (2005) justify 
theoretically why development banks give grants rather than loans to developing countries. Cohen, Jacquet 
and Reisen (2006) show that bilateral donors have favored grants over loans during the past three decades, 
and that in recent years, this preference has been emulated by multilateral aid agencies as well. 
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 In fact, we show that even when giving the aid as a gift is beneficial to the rich 
country, (compared to a situation of free trade without the aid), it still may be even more 
beneficial for the rich country to enforce a trade agreement on the poor country. The 
reason for that is that in the negotiations over the agreement the rich country can use its 
superior bargaining power which springs from having greater welfare than the poorer 
country in case the negotiations fail.2 
 The model is based on the two-sector growth model of Rebelo (1991) and on its 
two-country international trade extension developed by Felbermayr (2007). This model 
has several realistic virtues. First, it generates the empirically observed decline over time 
in the relative prices of capital goods in terms of consumption.3 Second, in the 
equilibrium of this model the developed country exports capital goods and the developing 
one exports consumption goods, as is typically the case in rich-poor countries trade 
relationships.4  
We model these negotiations according to the Nash Bargaining mechanism 
analyzed in Nash (1950). This axiomatic mechanism alleviates the need to specify the 
procedure and structure of the negotiations. Consequently, it predicts an outcome which 
depends only on feasible allocations of the surplus to be created by the agreement and on 
the consequences of non-agreement. In that sense this Nash bargaining mechanism is 
better for our purposes than other bargaining mechanisms, for example – the non-
cooperative ones of the type studied by Rubinstein (1982). 
                                                 
2
 In the model, the superior bargaining power of the rich country springs merely from having greater 
welfare than the poorer country in case the negotiations fail. No ad-hoc assumptions, of the type sometimes 
used in the bargaining literature, were used for enhancing this bargaining power. See further discussion of 
this point in sub-section 5.2. 
3
 See Cummins and Violante (2002) who calculate a decline of the relative price of capital goods in the 
United Stated at a rate of 3%-4% since 1974.  
4
 See the evidence in Felbermayr (2007). 
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The results of this paper shed some light, then, on how developed countries 
manage to gain more than developing countries from establishing bilateral trade 
relationships, as seem to be indicated by World Trade Organization (WTO) empirical 
evidence. Computable general equilibrium of the outcomes of the Uruguay Round 
agreements show, for example, a disproportional GDP benefit to developed countries, 
compared to that enjoyed by developing ones (Ackerman, 2005). Furthermore, Stiglitz 
(2002) argues that through the Uruguay Round developed countries have set a lopsided 
division of profits generated by globalization in their own favor, either through 
maintaining agricultural subsidies given to farmers in the developed countries, or by 
legislating property rights that reflect solely the interests of firms in the developed world. 
Thus, understanding the economic forces behind such agreements can help interpreting 
their outcomes. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a survey of the 
relevant literature on trade agreements and their outcomes. Section 3 sets up the basic 
growth and trade model. Section 4 describes the free trade scenario. Section 5 analyzes 
the bargaining-based trade agreement equilibrium, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A survey of the literature  
The economic relations between developing and developed countries are complex by 
nature. These relations are based mostly on two channels. The first is the transfer of 
resources as a loan or by foreign aid from the developed country to the developing one. 
The second is the cross-country trade between the two countries. These two channels are 
implicitly linked, as developed countries may tie the aid (or loan) to changing the terms 
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of trade in their favor. This enhances the donor country's welfare at the expense of the 
developing country. 
Foreign aid affects welfare either through promoting trade or growth, or by 
merely increasing income in the recipient country.5 The linkage, however, between the 
three aspects - foreign aid, trade and growth - is somewhat vague in the literature.  
Several studies explore the connection between aid and trade.6 Among them, the 
theoretical ones typically assume that the trade policies of both countries and the size of 
the transfer are exogenous. They also assume, that when foreign aid is tied to some policy 
variables in the recipient country, the tying rule is exogenous, usually tying the aid to the 
poorer country’s expenditure rather than to its trade policies. The few articles who 
abstract from such assumptions use static models, thus neglecting to consider the 
resulting growth implications of the relationship between foreign aid and trade. 
Moreover, these articles study tariff wars rather than trade agreements as a means of 
allocating surplus.7 In contrast, in this article we study a two-country growth model 
where the aid is tied to the trade policies by an agreement between the two countries.  
We focus on bilateral trade agreements signed between a developing country and 
a developed one, akin to the kind of regional bilateral trade agreements that were 
common during the 1990’s.8 Both parties to such agreements typically have to make 
concessions on different issues, including curtailing protectionist policies that were in 
                                                 
5
 Sometimes foreign aid might cause a decline in welfare in the recipient country. This phenomenon is the 
well-known ‘transfer paradox’. This paradox is not analyzed in the paper.  
6
 For a full survey of the linkage of aid and trade see Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier (2007). 
7
 For a more detailed survey of this strand of the literature see the introduction in Lahiri, Raimondos-
Moller, Wong and Woodland (2002).  
8
 For instance, since the early 1990s the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) has established an 
extensive network of contractual free trade relations all over the world, including Singapore, Egypt, Israel, 
Chile, Mexico, Croatia, Colombia and Lebanon. For more details see http://www.efta.int/content/free-
trade/fta-countries. 
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force prior the agreement. While such agreements have become more important and more 
widespread in recent years, there are still only few theoretical studies that attempted to 
study their general properties. Most of these studies concentrated on how bigger countries 
tend to win tariff wars, and typically employ static models, (e.g, Kennan and Riezman 
(1988)). The ones that do use dynamic models, like Devereux (1997), show that tariff 
wars reduce the world-wide growth rates compared to free trade, due to distortions 
inflicted by the tariffs. We examine in this paper what are the growth and welfare 
implications of tying foreign aid to costly trade policies even when such distortions are 
absent.  
Among the properties of trade agreements are the trade policies that each country 
is to employ. It is worth noting that these policies need not affect trade directly by 
affecting the price of commodities (like tariffs and subsidies do). Instead, these policies 
can affect trade indirectly via their direct effect on production. Wade (2003) argues that 
the agreements that arose from the Uruguay Round - TRIPS, TRIMS and GATS on 
investment, trade in services and property rights respectively - benefit the block of the 
developed countries at the expense of the block of the developing countries, not by 
affecting the relative price of commodities, but by limiting the development tools 
available of the developing countries.  
Multilateral trade agreements can often take resemblance to a bilateral agreement 
between developed and developing countries with conflicting interests (as suggested in 
the last paragraph). Most disputes preventing a new multilateral trade agreement among 
WTO members are between the block of developed countries led by European Union, US 
and Japan, and the block of developing countries led by India, Brazil, China and South 
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Africa. Clearly, the leading developed countries involved are those that also contribute 
most of the foreign aid. Theoretical studies assume that foreign aid is often motivated by 
economic considerations.9 Hence, it can be argued that for obtaining a comprehensive 
understanding of foreign aid tied to trade agreements, trade negotiations should be 
considered along with the developed country's decision to provide foreign aid, as we do 
in the paper. 
 
3. The Basic Model 
Consider a world consisting of two economies, North and South, denoted N and S.10 Each 
economy has a constant population. A representative agent in each economy seeks to 
maximize the following utility function: 
 
(1)  ∫
∞ −
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0
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where )(tc i  is per-capita consumption at economy i at t, { }SNi ,∈ , ρ and θ are constants 
satisfying 0<ρ<1 and 0<θ<1. The agent has one unit of labor which is supplied 
inelastically, owns the capital in the economy and continuously rents it to firms.  
The lifetime budget constraint of the representative agent in each economy is 
given by 
                                                 
9While Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that political rather than economic considerations underlie the aid 
given by developed countries in some cases, other studies, such as Asante (1985) claim that economic 
considerations typically motivate foreign aid. 
10
 These economies may be either two countries or two blocks of countries, as in the case of WTO 
negotiations. Without any loss of generality, we do not distinguish here between the two options. 
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where )(tP iq  is the relative price of capital in terms of consumption goods in country i at 
time t. )(tr i , )(tk i  and )(twi  are, respectively, the interest rate, capital and wage in 
country i at time t. 
Each economy has two competitive production sectors, one for consumption 
goods and the other for capital goods. Consumption goods (per capita) produced in 
country i at time t, denoted by )(tc iP , are given by: 
 
(3)  [ ]α)()( tkBtc iCiP = ,  
 
where 10 <<α , )(tk iC  is the amount of capital employed in producing consumption 
goods in country i at time t and B is a technology productivity factor. The subscript P 
denotes production. 
Capital goods are producible factors of production. The total amount of new 
capital goods in country i at time t, is denoted by )(tq i . The country i at time t local 
production of these capital goods is denoted by )(tq iP satisfying: 
 
(4)  [ ])()()( tktkAtq iCiiP −= , 
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where A is a technology productivity factor and )(tk i  is the per-capita amount of capital 
in country i at time t. With capital depreciation rate δ, the capital stock in each country 
evolves through time according to: 
 
(5)  )()()( tktqtk iii δ−=& . 
 
In a competitive equilibrium all markets clear at each point in time; firms 
maximize current profits, while the representative household rents labor and capital to 
firms, and chooses consumption so as to maximize the lifetime utility in (1).  
 Throughout the article the growth rates of capital, consumption and the relative 
price of capital in country i at time t shall be denoted by ( )tg ik , ( )tg ic  and ( )tg iP , 
respectively.  
The analysis is carried out under the following parametric assumption: 
 
Assumption 1: δρδθα −<<−− AA ))(1( . 
 
As shall be shown below, the first inequality in Assumption 1 suffices to satisfy 
the transversality condition ensuring that utility is bounded, and the second inequality is 
necessary for positive growth of consumption and capital. 
 
3.1 Autarky Equilibrium 
We start with the case of autarky, to be used as a benchmark for evaluating free trade and 
trade agreements outcomes later on. Under autarky consumption and investment are 
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based on local production alone, implying ( ) ( )tctc ipi =  and ( ) ( )tqtq ipi = . Since this 
case was already analyzed by Rebelo (1991), results are presented here without proof.  
In Equilibrium, profits maximizing firms are indifferent at the margin between 
employing capital for producing consumption and capital goods. That is: 
 
(6)  [ ] 1)()( −= αα tkBAtP iCiq . 
 
Each economy experiences no transitional dynamics, and grows along a Balanced 
Growth Path (BGP) in which gk, gc and gp are constants satisfying:  
 
(7)  
( )θα
ρδ
−−
−−
=
11
Agk ,   kC gg α= ,    gp = - (1 - α)gk. 
 
By Assumption 1 and (7), gk and gc are positive while gp is negative, implying 
consumption and capital grow over time while the relative price of capital falls over time. 
Note that gk, gc and gp are the same in both countries.  
The interest rate is constant over time and is given by: 
 
(8)  PgAr −−= δ . 
 
( ) ( )tktk iic / , i.e., the share of capital allocated to producing consumption is 
constant over time and given by: 
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( )( )
( )[ ]θα
δθαρ
γ
−−
−−−
≡
11
1
A
A
 . 
 
The optimal growth rate is given by:  
 
(9)  ( )ρ
θ
−= rgC
1
.  
 
The consumption level path in each country is then given by: 
 
(10)  [ ]αγ )()( tkBtc iiA = , 
 
where the subscript A refers to autarky. The difference in initial amount of capital, 
therefore, manifests itself through the levels of consumption and capital and not via their 
growth rates 
 
4. The Model with Free Trade 
In this section we study the case where the two countries freely trade with one another. 
Specifically we add to the above specified model the assumption that at t=0 the two 
economies unexpectedly start trading with each other and that from that moment on both 
countries face the same relative price between the two goods. We also assume that 
international capital markets are imperfect and take this assumption to the extremity in 
which international lending and borrowing is impossible. Since this extension of the 
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Rebelo (1991) model was already done by Felbermayr (2007), the results in this section 
too are presented without proofs. 
Without trade, the price of capital goods in the North is lower than in the South. 
Therefore, with trade the South imports capital goods, and exports consumption goods.  
At all times the North is producing both capital and consumption goods and 
producers in the North are indifferent at the margin between producing capital and 
consumption goods, implying that equation (6) holds for the North. In contrast, if (and 
only if) initially the South is sufficiently poorer that the North, i.e., if ( )0Sk  is 
sufficiently smaller than ( )0Nk , then the South specializes in producing consumption 
goods and refrains from producing investment goods. This is the case we focus on from 
here on. In appendix A we show that this case takes place if and only if 
( ) ( )00 2
NS kk γ
γ
−
≤ .11  
The specialization starts at t=0 and from then on this two-country world 
experiences transitional dynamics towards a balanced growth path in which capital and 
consumption in each country grow at a constant rate. The specialization of the South in 
consumption goods persists throughout these dynamics. The specialization in the South 
implies that the world equilibrium relative price of capital goods satisfies: 
 
(11)  [ ] 1)()( −≤ αα tk
A
B
tP Sq . 
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 Note that 12 <−γ
γ
 since 0<γ<1. 
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 (11) is an equality only along the BGP, a situation that the world economy, as said 
before, converges to. 
Capital evolves in each economy according to (5). However, in the free trade 
scenario, while goods markets are integrated, international lending and borrowing are 
ruled out by assumption. This implies that the trade balance in each country equals zero 
at all times, i.e., that: 
 
(12)  [ ] ),()()()()( tctctqtqtP iPiFTiiPq −=−  
 
where the FT-subscript represents free trade. In addition, the following clearing market 
condition must hold at all times: 
 
(13)  [ ] [ ]αα )()()()( tkBtkBtctc SNCSFTNFT +=+ . 
 
4.1. The balanced growth path 
Along the Balance Growth Path (BGP) capital and consumption grow at constant rates in 
both countries. As Felbermayr (2007) shows, (7), (8) and (9) hold on the BGP for both 
countries. The resulting interest rates equality implies equal marginal products of capital, 
so that )()( tktk SNC = . This in turn implies that, as in Autarky, the share of capital 
allocated to producing consumption goods in the North is the constant γ, since 
)(),( tktk NS and )(tk NC  must all grow at the same rate.  
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 The following Lemma establishes the productive efficiency of the BGP, a 
property that we use in analyzing foreign aid tied to trade policy in a cooperative trade 
agreement. The lemma looks at the different allocations to )0(Sk and )0(Nk of a given 
amount of an initial total world capital. As the lemma shows, the allocations that put the 
world on a BGP also maximize the world's total production of consumption goods at each 
point in time.    
 
Lemma 1: For each constant M>0, if )0(Sk and )0(Nk satisfy: 
 
(i) Mkk NS =+ )0()0(  
(ii) ( ) ( )0
2
0 NS kk
γ
γ
−
=  
 
then, for all t≥0, the world-wide consumption, ( ) ( )tctc SN + , is higher than under any 
other pair of  )0(Sk and )0(Nk that satisfy (i). 
 
Proof: Along the BGP )()( tktk NCS = , ensuring equal marginal products of capital in 
producing consumptions across North and South at each point in time. This proves the 
claim given identical and concave production technologies.                    ■  
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5. The Bargaining-Trade Equilibrium 
In the previous section it was shown that if initially South is sufficiently poorer than 
North then the world is on a dynamic path in which South specializes in producing 
consumption goods. In this section we show how the two countries can reach a Pareto 
superior outcome by tying foreign aid to trade.  
More specifically, this case where initially South is sufficiently poorer than North 
is characterized by )0()0( NCS kk <  and therefore, due to diminishing marginal product of 
capital in producing consumption goods, foreign aid in the form of a capital transfer from 
the North to the South would increase world-wide consumption without reducing future 
world-wide capital stocks. In this section we first find the optimal size of the aid, and 
then employ the Nash-bargaining mechanism to show how the two countries divide the 
surplus of world production created by this transfer.  
 
5.1 The optimal size of foreign aid 
Let Nk 0  and Sk 0  denote the initial pre-transfer values of capital in North and South, and 
let Tk denote the size of the capital transfer. In Appendix A we show how the magnitude 
of Tk needed for locating the world on its BGP is: 12  
 
 (14)  S
SN
k k
kkT 000 2
−
+
= γ . 
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 Note that if international borrowing and lending are allowed, equation (14) provides the size of the 
equilibrium loan taken by South, assuring equal returns to capital in both countries. The reasons for ruling 
out international B&L were discussed in a previous footnote. 
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Although this transfer maximizes equilibrium total world consumption at each 
point in time – it may not be optimal for the North to give it to the South. To see that, 
consider the case where the transfer is pure aid in the sense that after it is given to the 
South at t=0 the trade that develops is absolutely free. In that case, if Sk 0  is sufficiently 
small then it is possible that the loss of capital due to the transfer would harm North more 
than the gains from trade would benefit it.  We exemplify this possibility now for the 
extreme case in which Sk 0 =0. In that case the case of free trade with no aid collides with 
the case of autarky and, based on (10), consumption in the North satisfy:  
 
(15)  ( ) [ ]αγ )(0 0 tkBc NNFT =  
 
In appendix A it is shown that if free trade takes place after the transfer Tk has 
been delivered, then consumption in both countries satisfy:  
 
(16)  ( ) [ ]ααγ )0(1)0()0()0( NCNqNFT kBkAPc −+=  
 
and 
 
(17)  ( ) [ ]ααγ )0(1)0()0()0( SSqSFT kBkAPc −+= , 
 
where )0(Nk and )0(Sk  are post-transfer initial capital stocks the two countries. 
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Applying (6), ( ) ( )00 NcS kk = , ( ) kSS Tkk += 00 , ( ) kNN Tkk −= 00  and (14) in 
(16), yields: 
 
(18)  ( ) ( )[ ]
α
α γαγ 






 +
+−=
2
110 00
SN
N
FT
kkBc . 
 
Thus, if Sk 0 =0, consumption in the North, if it avoids aid, is above its 
consumption in the case it gives aid if: 
 
(19)  ( ) 0112 >−−− γαα  
 
an inequality that holds when ( )2ln1−>γ .  
By continuity, the result that under free trade consumption in the North may be 
better if it refrains from aid holds not just for Sk 0 =0 but also for a range of strictly 
positive, yet sufficiently small, values of Sk 0 . Note also that it was sufficient to 
exemplify it for consumption at t=0 since along the BGP consumption grows at a 
constant rate that is independent of Sk 0  and Nk 0 . 
 Thus, the capital transfer coupled with free-trade may or may not be Pareto 
improving. If it is, then North is better off even if the capital transfer is given as a gift, 
thus providing a simple, purely economic motivation for giving the aid. However, if the 
transfer is not Pareto improving, foreign aid and trade require that the North be 
compensated for the loss of capital by some kind of tying rule between aid and trade. 
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These compensating changes in trade policies can take many different forms, including 
tariffs, trade quotas, subsidies, or other policy tools affecting trade indirectly through 
their affect on production. We do not specifically model any of these policy concessions. 
Instead, we assume that these compensating trade arrangements can be represented by a 
welfare transfer from South to North. This allows us to use the bargaining mechanism as 
a solution concept for analyzing how can the North be compensated for the economic 
cost of giving foreign aid, without invoking non-economic (e.g. political) justifications. 
While the role of non-economic considerations is obvious and can be considerable, we 
want in this paper to examine how far purely economic considerations can go towards 
explaining observed ties between aid and trade policies.  
 
5.2 The Bargaining Setup 
Both countries have mutual interest in reaching an agreement, because foreign aid in the 
form of capital transfer creates a surplus of consumption without changing the growth 
rate. However, their interests are not identical, since each country desires a larger portion 
of the surplus.  
For that purpose we employ the Nash (1950) axiomatic bargaining approach. 
There are four axioms the Nash bargaining solution must satisfy. Specifically, the 
solution must be invariant to affine transformation, Pareto efficient; symmetric and 
independent of irrelevant alternatives. Note, that our utility function is independent of 
affine transformations. It also satisfies the axiom of the independency of irrelevant 
alternatives. In order to satisfy the other two assumptions, we must assume the following 
assumptions, (see Chan (1988)): 
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Assumption 2 The two countries have full information about the preferences of their 
trading partners. 
 
This assumption implies that the bargaining solution is Pareto efficient.  
 
Assumption 3 Negotiators from each country have the same bargaining skill.  
 
With this assumption and the fact that along the BGP the interest rates in both 
countries are equal, the bargaining solution should be symmetric in the sense that if the 
two countries are identical, their equilibrium payoffs are the same.  
Following Nash (1950), since the bargaining problem satisfies these four axioms 
– it has a unique solution which is the solution to the following problem: 
 
(20)  ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }SSSNNN
cc
SN UcUUcUMaxArgcc
SN
−⋅−=
,
,  
 
  s.t. 
 
(21)  ( )αSSN kBcc 2=+ , 
 
where ci represents the consumption level in country i at time 0 resulting from the Nash 
bargaining mechanism and iU  is the utility obtained by the representative consumer of 
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country i in case of disagreement. Ui is a function of the ci i.e, the country i time 0 
consumption alone, since the relevant equilibrium is along a BGP. Sk is the post-transfer 
capital in the South at t=0. 
The disagreement point in the model is the autarky payoffs for several reasons. 
First, we rely on the Shapley version of the Nash solution, where the disagreement point 
reflects the credible destructive power of each player, and therefore we use the 
disagreement point as the minimal guaranteed payoffs to each country. Another reason 
for choosing this disagreement point is the endogenous tying rule of aid to trade policies. 
Consider the following scenario: The North and the South negotiate over agreeable trade 
policies and aid in the form of capital transfer from North to South. Both countries know 
that compared to autarky, agreement will improve their welfare. The North can condition 
the capital transfer on the bargaining outcome. If the bargaining process fails, the North 
will not give the capital transfer, and both countries will continue on their autarkic BGP. 
Therefore, the disagreement point is the utilities under autarkic scenario. 
Alternative disagreement points, such as the free-trade allocation without transfer, 
are not credible. In such a scenario each country may impose tariffs unilaterally in an 
attempt to extract welfare from the other country. Kennan and Riezman (1988) showed 
how big countries win tariff wars. Hence, the free trade is not a credible disagreement 
point.  
The disagreement points based on Johnson’s Nash-Cournot tariff equilibrium, 
(see Mayer (1981) and Riezman (1982)), is a possible threat point. However, it may not 
be robust if other commercial policies (like quotas) are involved. Therefore, in order to 
generalize the solution to any commercial policies, we find the payoff in the autarky 
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scenario more suitable. Since our analysis is valid either for bargaining over tariff rates or 
other trade policies (such as direct transfers from the South to the North in terms of 
consumption goods), the Nash-Cournot tariff equilibrium cannot be used as the 
disagreement point. 
Notice also that, relative to South, North has greater bargaining power merely due 
to having a better disagreement point in case the negotiations fail, and that no ad-hoc 
assumptions magnifying this basic power are used.13 
 
5.3 The Bargaining-Trade Outcome 
Proposition 1 Both countries are better off in equilibrium with trade and bargaining than 
in autarky, regardless of initial capital endowments. 
 
Proof: The total production of consumption goods after the capital transfer is made is 
higher than in autarky, as Lemma 1 shows. This implies that the pair of autarky values of 
South and North consumption is feasible, and therefore the Nash product is positive. The 
Nash product given by equation (20) is positive if both countries are either better or 
worse off with trade. Since the utility functions are strictly increasing, both countries are 
better off at the solution ( ))0(),0( ** SN cc  than they are in autarky .            ■ 
 
While proposition 1 provides a possible motivation for trade agreement if North 
conditions the aid on a suitable trade agreement, it does not shed any light on whether the 
                                                 
13
 The general form of the Nash Product is ( )[ ] ( )[ ]SSSNNN UcUUcU −⋅− β , where β represents 
bargaining power. Here we assume β=1 implying that the superior bargaining power of the North springs 
merely from SN UU >  and not also from β >1. 
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two countries prefer that trade agreement over free-trade. Proposition 2 resolves this 
issue. 
 
Proposition 2: For some initial capital endowments, North is better off (and the South is 
worse off) under bargaining over trade and aid than under free-trade. 
 
Proof: Maximizing the Nash product given by (20) implies the following first order 
condition: 
 
(22)  ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 01111 =−−− −−−− θθθθθθ SASSNANN cccccc , 
 
where iNc  and iAc are consumption levels under agreement (if achieved)  and autarky in 
country i at t=0, respectively. 
Using the constraint ( )αSNS kBcc 2=+ it is possible to define the LHS of (22) 
as the function:  
.  
(23)          ( )NNN kkcN 00 ,,  
          
         ≡ ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )





 −−−−−
−−−− θθαθαθθθ 1111 22 SA
NSNSN
A
NN cckBckBccc . 
 
  22 
Note that Nk 0  and Sk 0 manifest themselves in this function through NAc , SAc  by 
(10) and through Sk which along the BGP satisfies 
2
00
SN
S kkk += γ . Thus, 
( )NNN kkcN 00,  is strictly increasing in Nc .  We now show that this function is negative 
when evaluated at the free trade allocation, implying that the argument that maximizes 
the Nash product is larger than the consumption level of the North under free trade. 
The solution to the Nash maximization problem in (20) has the property that a 
player's outcome improves with his own disagreement outcome, and decreases with his 
opponent's disagreement outcome. Consequently, since the function )(•N  is continuous, 
if the proposition holds when 0=kT , then it is also true for some neighborhood of 
strictly positive capital transfers.  
From equation (14) we know that when 0=kT ,  
 
(24)  SN kk
γ
γ−
=
2
 
 
From (11), (16) and the result that along the BGP SNC kk =  it follows that the 
consumption levels under free trade when 0=kT  satisfy: 
 
(25)  ( ) ( )[ ]γαα −+= 11SN kBc , 
 
and 
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(26)  ( ) ( )[ ]γαα −−= 11SS kBc . 
 
Substituting (10), (24), (25), (26) and x≡1-γ into the function )(•N  and 
simplifying yields: 
 
(27)  ( )=NcN ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ])1()1( 11112 θαθθαθα ααα −− −−+++− xxxxxkB S . 
 
The RHS of (27) is negative if and only if the term in square brackets is negative, 
which we prove in appendix B.                ■ 
 
Proposition 2 shows that when 0=kT , the bargaining outcome makes North 
better off, and South worse off compared to free trade without aid. We now show that 
North is better off and South is worse off compared to free trade with aid when 0>kT . 
 
Proposition 3: North is better off (and South is worse off) under bargaining over trade 
and aid than under free-trade with aid. 
 
Proof: Equation (18) provides the consumption level in North in case it gives aid to 
South. Differentiating it according to Sk0 , we receive: 
 
(28)  ( )[ ] 0
22
11
1
00
0
>






 +−+
=
∂
∂
−αα αγαγ SN
S
N
FT kkB
k
c
. 
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Thus, for any given Nk0 , the smaller Sk0 , the lower NFTc . To show that the lower 
Sk0 , the higher *Nc , we show in appendix C that 0
0
<
∂
∂
S
N
k
c
. Thus, the positive gap 
N
FT
N cc −*  widens as Sk0  decreases, i.e., as Tk  becomes strictly positive.         ■    
 
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that for some capital endowments if the North 
conditions the capital transfer in imposing trade policies that are in its favor, it may gain 
from it more than it could in free trade. In such cases, foreign aid to poor countries may 
improve their welfare, but first and foremost it benefits the richer countries. Since this is 
known to both countries, we can assume that the rich country prefers trade negotiations 
over free trade and predict that in such cases trade agreements are the preferred 
mechanism for regulating trade between North and South, as is often observed. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we construct a dynamic growth model that combines international trade and 
foreign aid. We evaluate welfare in the donor and the recipient countries, and argue that 
foreign aid need not affect growth rates in either country. We also argue that the 
consumption levels do change due to the foreign aid. The foreign aid in the paper is tied 
to international trade policies.  
The paper suggests that while free trade is best to the developing country, it may 
not be so for the developed one. As a result, by endogenizing the tie rule of the foreign 
aid to international trade policies through a bargaining mechanism, welfare is transferred 
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from the developing country to the developed one, via trade agreements which are 'good' 
for the developed country. While these trade agreements make both countries better off 
compared to autarky; for some initial capital endowments these agreements also make the 
developed country better off compared to free-trade. This implies, of course, that while 
the developing country prefers free trade to a trade agreement, it would still be better off 
under the trade agreement than under autarky, and thus a trade agreement is still 
acceptable.  
Although we do not model explicitly the trade policies over which countries 
bargain, we do show that there exist welfare transfers, reflecting direct resource transfers, 
subsidies or tariffs, which can then tie foreign aid to trade policies.  
This result sheds some light over current negotiations between developed and 
developing countries, (in the context of the Doha Round), and the present stalemate in 
these talks. According to its proponents, the last round of negotiations aims to make trade 
fairer for the developing countries,14 and it is frequently referred as “The Doha 
Developing Round”. This round and its failure in Cancun, Mexico (2003), and later again 
in Geneva (2008) was partly attributed to the wide gaps between the developed and 
developing countries. Furthermore, most computable general equilibrium measures of the 
forecasted outcomes of the Doha Round show not only low gains on the aggregate, but 
also skewed outcomes towards developed countries (Ackerman, 2005). Since the round 
has not been terminated we cannot predict its ultimate conclusions. We can forecast in 
light of our analysis, that if an agreement is eventually obtained, it will favor the 
developed countries rather than the developing ones, despite declared goals to the 
contrary of these talks. 
                                                 
14
 For more details, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doha_Round#cite_note-7. 
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Appendix A 
The lifetime budget constraint of the representative agent in each economy is given by 
(2). Notice that since along the BGP )()( tktk SNC = , wages in both countries are equal and 
given by [ ]αα )()1()( tkBtw S−= . It is straightforward that wages grow along the BGP at 
the same rate as consumption. Hence, the lifetime budget constraint in each country can 
be written as: 
 
(A1)  ( ) ( )∫ ∫
∞ ∞
−− ⋅−+⋅=⋅
0 0
)0()1()0()0()0( dteBkkPdtec trgSiqtrgiFT kk αα α . 
 
From (8), 
θ
ρ
α
−
=
rgk , hence: 
 
(A2)  ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ρδθα
θαθα
ρδθα
α
−−−
−−
== ∫∫
∞






−−
−−−∞
−
A
dtedte
t
A
trgk
1
11
0
11
1
0
. 
 
Substituting (A2) into (A1) and calculating )0(NFTc and )0(SFTc  yields (16) and (17).  
At t=0 South gets a capital transfer from North. As a result, the relative price of 
capital satisfies the following condition: 
  
(A3)  [ ]
A
TkBP k
S
q
1
0 )0()0()0(
−
+
=
α
α
. 
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Notice that )0()0()0( 0 kNN Tkk −=  and )0()0()0( 0 kSS Tkk += . Substituting these 
expressions into (16) and (17) and the latter expressions with (A3) into the clearing 
market condition (13) implies (14). 
 
Appendix B 
In this appendix we complete the proof of Proposition 2  by showing that: 
 
(B1)  F(x) ≡ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 011112 )1()1( <−−+++− −− θαθθαθ ααα xxxxx , 
 
for each set of values for (x, α, θ) in the relevant range. Recall that each of these 
parameters must be in the interval (0, 1). The proof is based on showing that ( ) 00 =F , 
( ) 00' =F  and ( ) 0" <xF  for all 0<x<1. 
 ( ) 00 =F  follows directly from (B1). Differentiating F(x) and simplifying yields: 
 
(B2)  ( )
α
xF '
 =  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1)1()1(1 11)1(112 −−−− ++−−++− θαθθαθ αθαθ xxxx  
            ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1)1()1(1 11)1(11 −−−− −−−−−−− θαθθαθ αθαθ xxxx . 
 
 ( ) 00' =F  follows directly from (B2). Differentiating the LHS of (B2) and 
simplifying yields, after tedious, yet straightforward, arithmetics: 
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(B3)  ( )
( )( )θαα −− 11
" xF
 = 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) )1(22
22
)1(22
22
11
11
11
11
θαθθαθ α
αααθ
α
αααθ
−−−−−− −−
−+−
−
++
++−
xx
xx
xx
xx
, 
 
< 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) )1(22
2
)1(22
2
11
1
11
1
θαθθαθ α
α
α
α
−−−−−− −−
−
−
++
+
xx
x
xx
x
 
 
< 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) )1(22
2
)1(22
2
11
1
11
1
θαθθαθ αα
α
αα
α
−−−−−− −−
−
−
++
+
xx
x
xx
x
 
 
    = 
( ) ( ) θθαθθα αα −−−−−− −
−
+ )1(2)1(2 1
1
1
1
xx
 < 0 
 
where the three inequalities are based on α , θ  and x  being within the interval (0, 1). 
This establishes ( ) 0" <xF  which completes the proof 
 
Appendix C 
In this appendix we complete the proof of Proposition 3 by showing that cN, the 
consumption of the North at t=0 under a trade agreement, is a decreasing function of Sk 0 .  
 Due to (22) and (23): 
 
(C1)  ( )NNN kkcN 00 ,,  = 0, 
 
which defines cN as an implicit function of  Sk 0  and Nk 0 . Simplifying  (23) yields: 
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 (C2)        ( )SNN kkcN 00 ,,  = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) θθααθθ −− −+−− 11 222 SANSSNANN cckBkBccc  
 
Differentiating (C2), bearing in mind the BGP property of ( )SNS kkk 002 += γ  and 
also that SAc  is a function of 
Sk 0  through (10), yields: 
 
(C3)          ( )S
SNN
k
kkcN
0
00 ,,
∂
∂
= ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) θαθαα γαθαγ −−−− −+− 1111 2 SASNSS ckBckBkB  
             ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( ) γαθ αθθα 10112 −−−−+ SSANS kBcckB  
 
 Substituting ( ) NS ckB −α2  by cS, which follows from (21), and noticing that 
SS kk 0>  because the South imports capital from North, leads to: 
 
(C4)          ( )S
SNN
k
kkcN
0
00 ,,
∂
∂
 > 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]θθθθ
α
θθ
αγ −−−
−
−++−
111
1 11
S
A
SS
A
S
S
cccc
k
B
 
> ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 





−++−
−−− θθθθ
θθ
αγ S
A
S
S
S
AS
A
S
S ccc
c
cc
k
B 11 11  = 0 
 
where the second inequality follows from the result that SSA cc <  shown in lemma 1.  
This leads to: 
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(C5)  00
0
>
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
N
S
S
N
c
N
k
N
k
c
, 
 
which holds because the numerator is positive by (23) and the denominator is positive, as  
follows immediately from (23)  
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